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Abstract 
This article critically discusses the powers held by the European Commission in enforcing 
competition law within Europe and in other territories. The article contains an analysis of 
current commentary of the enforcement of competition law and comparison between 
opinions that the Commission’s powers are too great and suggestions that its powers are not 
potent enough to ensure competition is protected in Europe. 
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Introduction 
Competition law is an area which is concerned with maintaining a single European Market 
that is as close to a ‘perfect market’ or a ‘free market economy’ as possible. Although this 
‘perfect market’ principle ‘bears little relation to reality’, many governments have provisions 
for competition policy, to help reach such ideals, and the means by which competition policy 
is implemented.’1 is known simply as competition law. A ‘free market economy’ is a concept 
originally attributed to Adam Smith, which involves a market where there are no artificial 
obstacles, such as price controls, meaning it can flourish through the natural fluctuation of 
supply and demand.2 In the context of competition law, the ‘free market’ must also not be 
hindered by restrictions created by businesses within it that may conspire to ‘fix prices’3 or 
distort the market in any other way. However, even the application of a ‘free market 
economy’ must utilise at least basic regulation and governmental influence, such as with the 
protection of personal rights of ownership through property law and transactional rules 
through contract law. Moreover, interference and regulation is also necessary where there 
are policy reasons to maintain it such as with the health sector and basic utility services. In 
                                            
1 Jones, A., and Sufrin, B., EU Competition Law; Text, Cases and Materials (2014, 5th Edition, Oxford 
University Press), p.1. 
2 Smith, A., ‘The Wealth of Nations’, (1776) reprinted in 1999 by Penguin Books. 
3 An issue recognised by Smith also. 
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these situations, although it would be possible for private companies to make a profit whilst 
participating in the market, there are clear benefits to governmental intervention in 
maintaining a fair supply.  
 
There are many reasons for a government to promote the exercise of a free market through 
enforcing competition law. Although the concept of a free market can be seen as ‘stylised 
and abstract’4, the features of such a market are clearly beneficial. The main benefits include 
the presence of a multitude of buyers and sellers where the buyers can have clear access to 
information on particular products and new products can enter the market freely. As a result, 
competition law is partly based on the principle of protecting consumers and ensuring that 
they also receive a benefit at the same time as an undertaking. Part of the justification for 
merger control in competition enforcement is to prevent significant monopolies on a 
particular market; this in turn protects and supports innovation in products and services as 
where there is a monopoly, undertakings are not compelled to improve their products5. 
Therefore, by maintaining a market with many sellers from whom consumers can choose, 
products constantly improve to allow undertakings to gain an advantage over their 
competitors.  
 
The goals of competition law also include the promotion of integration between Member 
States (MS’s) and the ‘promotion of effective and undistorted competition’6, however, it 
would appear that the most important goal is securing efficiency in the marketplace. 
Marketplace efficiency can be broken down in to three identifiable types; ‘allocative’, 
‘productive’ and ‘dynamic’. Allocative efficiency, a concept first developed by Vilfredo Pareto, 
outlines where the market price of a product is equal to its marginal cost. The resulting 
equilibrium ensures that only product for which there is already demand is created. The 
second principle is that of productive efficiency. This is similar to allocative efficiency as it 
results from a perfectly competitive market in which all manufacturers produce goods at the 
lowest price possible and so any improvements to the price of development are passed on to 
the consumer. Finally, dynamic efficiency is determined mostly by innovation but is still 
influenced by competitiveness. This concept of efficiency is argued to be delivered better by 
a monopolistic market7, which is an argument that many economists would disagree with 
and most enforcers of competition law would avoid. The confusion as to the most 
economically efficient and successful method of a market means that the enforcement of 
                                            
4 Graham, C., EU and UK Competition Law, (2014, 2nd Edition, Pearson Publishing) p.20. 
5 Motta, M., Competition Policy (CUP 2004) pp.56-7. 
6 Bishop, S., and Walker, M., ‘The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and 
Measurement. University Edition’ (2010, 3rd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell), p.5. 
7 Schumpeter, J. A., ‘Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy’ (1942, Routledge). 
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competition law cannot be seen as an exact science, as there will always be an argument 
that the wrong form of competition is being enforced. This creates difficulties for competition 
authorities such as the European Commission as the ‘trade-offs’ made between the different 
types of efficiency may have an adverse effect on the market.  
 
Despite the confusion as to what specifically the Commission should be enforcing to protect 
the free market, there is still a need to maintain it using fair and effective enforcement of 
competition law. As a result, the European Commission has been granted a wide range of 
extensive powers to ensure the market is able to operate optimally. The significant impact 
the Commission can have on the progress of undertakings and the fines it can impose have 
fuelled criticism for the extent to which it should be able to exercise such powers. There is no 
doubt that the role carried out by the Commission is essential to protecting the European 
Market, and therefore care should be taken in recommending any restrictions of its powers, 
yet there is a clear need to examine how it implements such rules and whether there is 
always a benefit balanced against the adverse effects on undertakings.   
 
Such powers that often come under scrutiny include the Commission’s investigatory abilities 
to demand information and conduct Dawn Raids at premises of undertakings. The disruption 
caused to employees and the negative publicity involved highlights the importance of 
maintaining efficient checks and balances on the actions and powers granted to the 
Commission. Following from such investigations, the Commission will often impose fines on 
undertakings for breaking either substantive competition law, in the form of anti-competitive 
behaviour, or procedural law, by not fully complying with the instructions of the Commission 
and its inspectors. An undertaking is capable of breaching competition law in a number of 
ways including by abusing its dominant position in the market, taking part in anti-competitive 
practices with other undertakings (cartels) or attempting mergers that would result in an 
unfair distortion on the market. The power held by the Commission to fine for procedural and 
substantive breaches of competition law is an interesting and controversial area as it clearly 
needs to have the ability to fine undertakings in order to both punish and deter, however the 
extent to which it should be able to do this for minor procedural breaches that may have had 
no impact on the market is controversial.  
 
1 Powers of Investigation  
Request for information 
In order to perform its job as an enforcer of competition policy through prohibiting anti-
competitive activity, the Commission has been granted certain powers of investigation as 
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‘detection of infringements of competition rules is difficult’8 in its very nature. The success of 
recent enforcement of competition law by the Commission has ‘…been largely dependent on 
efficient and effective investigatory tools’.9 These powers have often come under scrutiny for 
being too broad and too far reaching. As will be examined later, it is arguable that the 
balance between effective enforcement of competition law and the adequate protection of 
the fundamental rights of natural and legal persons has not yet been achieved, meaning that 
some form of development in the way of safeguarding the powers of the Commission and 
National Competition Authorities (NCA’s) in a more efficient manner is still needed. 
 
Under the Modernisation Regulation,10, it has been outlined that complaints concerning 
breaches of competition law11 can be made to either the Commission or the NCA in the 
area, both of which can undertake investigations and formal proceedings against 
undertakings. The national courts are then able to hear cases involving breaches of Articles 
101 and 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). After investigative 
proceedings have begun, the Commission can ‘by simple request or by decision, require 
undertakings and associates of undertakings to provide all necessary information’ including 
the MS’s government and NCA’s12, as a right given under Article 1813 of the Regulation. This 
created some confusion at the time, as the term ‘necessary information’ was ambiguous and 
required defining by the court. In SEP14, the undertaking brought an action to annul a 
Commission decision after being ‘…condemned…for failing to comply with a request for 
information’,15 the General Court16 (GC) stated that the term must be interpreted with 
reference to the purposes for which the Commission was conferred its powers of 
investigation and the information must be related to the presumed infringement at that stage 
of proceedings,17 which was upheld by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)18.  
 
Many agree that these ‘…formal powers are crucial for obtaining information when 
undertakings do not provide it voluntarily’19 however, this is the first area of concern with 
                                            
8 Fairhurst, J., Law of the European Union, (2012, 9th Edition, Pearson Education Ltd), p.743. 
9 Anderson, H., ‘Dawn Raids under challenge’, (2014) 35(3) ECLR 135, p.135. 
10 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, OJL1, 4.1.2003 pp1-25. 
11 Complainants should provide the Commission/NCA’s with any and all relevant information in their 
possession. See Form C (Annex to Reg.773/2004) and Section 13.D, p.1071. 
12 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, OJ L1, 4.1.2003 pp1-25, Article 18(6).  
13 Ibid, Article 18. 
14 Case T- 39/90, SEP v. Commission [1991] ECR II-1497. 
15 Ezrachi, A., EU Competition Law; An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases, (2014, 4th Edition, Hart 
Publishing), p.502. 
16 Previously the Court of First Instance. 
17 Case T- 39/90, SEP v. Commission [1991] ECR II-1497, at para.29. 
18 Case C- 36/92P, SEP v. Commission, [1994] ECR I-1911. 
19 Jones, A., and Sufrin, B., EU Competition Law p.939. 
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regards to the powers of the Commission. This is because the Commission itself has 
discretion as to what information it deems relevant for its investigation and can issue fines to 
anyone who fails to comply with a request by giving misleading or incorrect information.20 
The maximum fine has been raised from previous years in the new Regulation to a total of 
1% of the undertaking’s turnover in the preceding business year,21 indicating the importance 
of fair application of this right. The increase was an attempt to combat the difficulty caused 
by inflation that had ‘eroded the effectiveness of the penalties provided’’22 in the previous 
regulation, which outlined a specific monetary value. Therefore it could appear that the 
percentage outlined does not raise the fine value on the undertaking but simply maintains a 
steady representation of their liability. 1% appears to be a nominal fine considering the size 
and turnover of some of the undertakings in question. The failure to disclose information 
after a request or demand should surely bring with it a higher fine, as otherwise there is a 
possibility for undertakings to avoid liability for the actual infringement of competition law that 
brings with it much higher fines.  
 
Despite the possible shortcomings of the Commission’s fining ability regarding a request or 
demand for information, recent judgments by the GC have supported and upheld the 
investigative powers of the Commission.23 The GC has held that the Commission has the 
ability to request information where it reasonably expects it will determine that an alleged 
infringement took place, and that the Commission is not obliged to have any information 
establishing the existence of infringement prior to a request for information from an 
undertaking. Although this indicates an extreme strength on the Commission’s part, as there 
is little need for thorough investigation prior to a request, it would appear that such a 
decision is fair in that it would be unreasonable to expect the Commission to be able to 
obtain documents that incriminate an undertaking without information directly from it. 
However, the cases above at least outline that, although the Commission’s request for 
information can be broad and that there is still some uncertainty as to the parameters of 
what they can request, it cannot go on a ‘complete fishing expedition’ as the court is likely to 
hold that the request was not necessary.24 A decision for the demand of information under 
Article 18(3) must contain specific information including its legal basis; the purpose of the 
investigation and the information required of the undertaking. The decision must also clearly 
                                            
20 Regulation 1/2003, Article 23(1)(a).  
21 For fines, generally see Section 8.G, p.994 ff. 
22 Riley, A., ‘Saunders and the power to obtain information in Community and United Kingdom 
competition law’, (2000) 25(3) EL. Rev 264, p.265. 
23 Cases T-292/11, T-293/11, T-297/11, T-302/11, T-305/11 and T-306/11, 14 March, 2014. 
For a summary on the outcome of these cases see: ‘European Commission welcomes General Court 
judgments confirming its investigatory powers.’, Comp. Law. 2014, 35(6), 174 
24 Jones, A., and Sufrin, B., EU Competition Law p.940. 
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include a time limit along with a warning of the fines the undertaking will be liable for if it 
does not comply and a notice specifying that the decision can be reviewed by the court.25 
These strict specifications mean that the Commission would appear to be restricted in 
exercising its powers. These safeguards mean that the undertaking subject to a request or 
demand is entitled to a judicial remedy if they feel that a request has been made with no 
reasonable suspicion on the part of the Commission, as these legal reasons would need to 
be outlined in the request. 
 
Dawn Raids 
Along with the powers of the Commission to request or demand information from 
undertakings and other relevant parties, the ‘most powerful weapon available…is by far the 
powers to carry out unannounced inspections, dawn raids’.26 Under Article 20 of the 
Regulation, the Commission may ‘conduct all necessary inspections of undertakings or 
associations of undertakings’27 which are usually undertaken by the relevant NCA’s with its 
authorisation. There are two types of inspections available, either a ‘voluntary’ inspection28 
which poses little in the way of criticism and complaint as, although it requires officials to 
produce written authorisation, undertakings are under no legal obligation to comply with the 
inspectors. However, the second form of inspection, known as a ‘mandatory inspection’ or 
‘Dawn Raid’ requires29 that the Commission must have a Decision beforehand. This allows 
the Commission’s inspectors to enter the undertaking’s premises; homes of directors, 
managers or staff that may have business records; examine copy and remove documents 
and check emails30. Under the new Regulation, these activities that the Commission were 
empowered to perform are extended to be able to conduct interviews and seal off the 
premises or certain records31 in order to ‘protect competition effectively’32. These ‘Dawn 
Raids’ do not require advance notice33 to be given to the undertaking but it is obliged to 
cooperate. They do not require the presence of a lawyer and generally the inspectors will 
only wait a short time before beginning their examination of documents and records. As a 
result, they can be extremely disruptive to a company both in the business sense and 
                                            
25 Regulation 1/2003, Article 24. 
26 Anderson, ‘Dawn Raids’, p.135. 
27 Regulation 1/2003, Article 20(1).  
28 Article 20(3).  
29 Article 20(4).  
30 These powers were originally set out in regulation (Art 14(1) Regulation 17/62). 
31 Regulation 1/2003, Article 20(2).  
32 Fairhurst, Law of the European Union, p.743. 
33 Case 136/79 National Panasonic (UK) Ltd v Commission [1980]  ECR 2033. 
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personally for members of staff subjected to such a frightening experience.34 Furthermore, 
these ‘Dawn Raids’ are a frequent tactic used by the Commission and NCAs and there are 
many recent examples of such cases in the UK35. Many consider that ‘…community 
competition law seems to have given more prominence to the effectiveness of the 
Commission’s inspections than the protection of the rights of defence of undertakings’36 and 
therefore the powers of inspection held by the Commission in relation to Dawn Raids is an 
area worth investigating as it would appear that, despite frequent outcry and complaints from 
companies, their powers are becoming stronger and they are more willing to inspect than 
ever. 
 
Recent case law indicates that the Commission has developed its scope in relation to the 
requirement to obtain a decision before conducting a Dawn Raid. This is a particular area for 
concern that requires examination. The French NCA’s case of Société Colas Est37 indicated 
in 2004 that where an inspection had no prior Decision it had violated Article 8 of the ECHR 
(right to respect of private and family life). This judgment was based on the fact that there 
were few safeguards in place during the inspection and cases since have extended the 
Commission’s ability to Dawn Raid properties without prior authorisation. This case raised 
the question of whether ex ante control on inspections is ‘necessary for a system to meet the 
requirements of art.8’38 as despite the ruling that the excessive inspections had violated the 
ECHR, the undertakings still suffered great detriment at the time of the inspections, which 
cannot be rectified.  
 
Since 2004, other cases such as Bernh Larsen Holding AS39 have supported and developed 
the idea of an ‘overall assessment rather than viewing a prior judicial authorisation as an 
absolute requirement’.40.] In Deutsche Bahn AG41 the GC declared outright that there was 
no absolute need for judicial authorisation as long as there are effective safeguards in place 
during the inspections. The court specified that these safeguards included: the requirement 
                                            
34 In response to the increased use of Dawn Raids by the Commission and NCA’s, some companies 
offer ‘Dawn Raid Response Services’ to help companies cope with the disruption caused. See for 
example: http://www.macroberts.com/content/content_431.html accessed on 02.02.2015. 
35 An investigation in to oil company practices led to inspections at Shell’s London Office and BP 
along with others. See http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2013/may/14/bp-shell-oil-price-rigging, 
accessed online 02.02.2015 
36 Berghe, P. and Dawes, A., ‘Powers of inspection’, p.423. 
37 Société Colas Est v France (2004) 39 EHRR 17, See Buyse. A., ‘Strings attached: the concept of 
‘home’ in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.’ (2006) 3, ECHR 294-307. 
38Anderson, ‘Dawn Raids’ p.136. 
39 Bernh Larsen Holding AS v Norway (24117/08) (2014) 58 E.H.R.R. 8  
Anderson, ‘Dawn Raids’ p.137. 
41 Deutsche Bahn AG v Commission of the European Communities (T-289/11) September 6, 2013 at 
[66]–[78].  
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for the Commission to provide reasons for their decision to inspect; the effective restrictions 
governing inspectors during dawn raids; the Commission may not use force during an 
inspection; National Authorities have the right to intervene or enforce the inspection; and, 
most notably, the undertaking is entitled to request a judicial review after the inspection.42 
Although at the time it would have appeared that these safeguards counterbalanced the 
reduced requirement for a Decision from the Commission and ensured that the rights of 
undertakings were protected during investigations, subsequent cases would show otherwise. 
In the case of Ravon,43 the appellant appealed against a warrant and inspection of his 
premises and home.44 The courts saw these appeals as inadmissible because they were 
‘not empowered to review measures taken by the tax authorities once inspections had been 
affected’.45 The judgement in relation to a tax authority is relevant to the progression of 
competition inspection powers as ‘the powers of inspection of the French authorities in tax 
matters are similar in many ways to those of the European Commission in competition 
proceedings’.46 Ravon could not review the legality of the inspections in court as no criminal 
charges were brought against him or his company. This quite clearly contravenes the 
principle of an appellant having access to a judicial review after such an inspection and the 
ECtHR agreed and decided that Art 6(1) of the ECHR had been infringed; they also stated 
that the right to judicial access ‘implies with respect to premises searches, that the persons 
sought may obtain an effective judicial review in fact and law’47 and that the presence of 
judicial authorisation for an inspection does not compensate for a lack of review. This case 
indicates the importance of a judicial review both in tax and competition inspections and 
highlights the need for such a review in the safeguards offered during a ‘Dawn Raid’. The 
concept that the French in particular tried to adopt in preventing a judicial review where there 
was no infringement by an undertaking has been challenged on other occasions in 
competition law scenarios by the Strasbourg court who have stated unequivocally that such 
a restriction of review is an infringement of Article 6(1) as seen in Primagaz.48  
 
Despite the developments by the Strasbourg court to create an effective balance between 
the powers of inspection granted to the Commission and NCAs, by allowing them to inspect 
without a decision as long as there are effective controls in place to safeguard the rights of 
                                            
42 Deutsche Bahn AG v Commission of the European Communities (T-289/11) September 6, 2013 at 
[74]. 
43 Ravon v France (18497/03) Unreported February 21, 2008. 
44 The inspection was in relation to tax laws, however the court decision is equally relevant to 
competition inspections. 
45 Anderson, ‘Dawn Raids’ p.137, paraphrasing transcript of Ravon v France (18497/03) at [8]-[10] 
46 Berghe, P. and Dawes, A., ‘Powers of inspection’ p.408. 
47 Ravon v France (18497/03) at para [30]. 
48 Primagaz (29613/08) December 21, 2010. See also Société Canal Plus v France (29408/08) 
Unreported, December 21, 2010. 
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the undertaking, the GC appears to not accept such developments in relation to the ex post 
control through judicial review. In the case of Nexans49 and Prysmian50 the GC annulled part 
of the inspection decisions51 on the grounds that they were too broad, yet did not allow the 
measures to be challenged regardless of the unlawful segments of the decisions. The court 
said that these individual measures could only be challenged when the undertakings came 
to challenge the final decision by the Commission, which had not yet been presented. This 
contradicts the standpoint taken by the Strasbourg court and has been criticised by 
commentators as ‘not satisfactory’ partly because it does not allow undertakings a 
reasonable time in which to file for judicial review, as the decisions by the Commission can 
take years.  
 
Although the difficulties in ensuring the safeguards for undertakings and their rights is a key 
issue which needs more investigation and reform on the part of the Commission, one area in 
which it is argued that ‘Dawn Raids’ and their disruption are ‘sine qua non for effective 
competition law enforcement’52 is concerned with the current Leniency Notice.53 The fines 
undertakings are liable to differ depending on whether they have infringed competition law or 
impeded investigations. The Leniency Notice allows undertakings an opportunity to reduce 
their fine if they come forward with information on a known anti-competitive cartel that they 
are involved with. If undertakings did not expect their collusion and documents linking them 
to such activity to be discovered outside of their offices, there would be no incentive to come 
forward with information (which is often vital to the Commission to proceed with their 
investigations). Therefore it is argued that the use of the Leniency Notice only works where 
‘one cartel member… believes that the cartel risks being detected and punished without 
leniency’54 as the fear of detection is sufficient to encourage the use of provided leniency 
regimes.  
 
Electronic Data 
Along with the ability to Dawn Raid premises without a decision and the hefty fines available 
for undertakings that do not comply with investigatory obligations, the Commission has also 
attempted to ‘to bolster its enforcement armoury and to minimise the risks of crucial 
                                            
49 Nexans France SAS [2013] 4 CMLR 6. 
50 Prysmian and Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi Energia v Commission (T-140/09) [2012] Unreported, 
November 14, 2012. 
51 The court likened the measures under question to copy hard drives and computer files to the 
inspection decision and so treated them as one and the same. 
52 Anderson, ‘Dawn Raids’ p.135. 
53 Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, OJ 2006, C 
298/17 
54 Anderson, ‘Dawn Raids’ p.135. 
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electronic data going astray’55 by introducing revised guidelines on Dawn Raid inspections in 
201356. These guidelines allow official inspectors to request the temporary blocking of email 
accounts, administrator access rights to computers and other electronic forms of inspection 
such as on laptops and mobile phones.57 Commentators such as Wood see this extension of 
the Commission’s inspectoral rights as an attempt to combat the ‘major enforcement 
headaches for competition authorities’58 created through the increased reliance of 
businesses on electronic data and communication. The Commission enforces this form of 
obligation on undertakings through Regulation 1/2003 under Article 23(1)(c) in which 
businesses are required to ‘submit to an inspection’. The definition and scope of ‘submitting’ 
to such an inspection in relation to electronic information recently came under scrutiny in the 
case of Energeticky a prumyslovy and EP Investment Advisors v Commission59 which took 
place before the introduction of the new regulations concerning electronic information. 
 
In Energeticky, the undertaking was subject to a 0.25% fine of their turnover based on two 
infringements of electronic inspection obligations. Although the Commission concluded that 
there had not been a breach of Article 101 or 102 TFEU, the act of intentionally obstructing 
investigations by diverting emails and of unblocking an email account60 were seen as 
‘serious’ incidents that required a penalty. Wood argues that the actions of employees of the 
company simply ‘inconvenienced the inspectors’ 61 rather than a serious infringement and so 
their fine was based on a desire to deter unhelpful conduct instead of reflecting their level of 
culpability. Therefore it would appear reasonable to assume that when the undertaking 
appealed to the GC they were likely to receive at least some form of reduction in their fine. 
However, instead of reducing Energeticky’s fine, the GC suggested that to ‘submit’ to an 
inspection had a wider meaning than first thought. They chose to increase the benchmark of 
compliance to a higher level as it encompasses adherence to both oral and written 
                                            
55 Wood, A., ‘Submitting to an inspection during a Competition investigation: the General Court's 
ruling in Case T-272/12 Energeticky a prumyslovy and EP Investment Advisors v Commission’, 
(2014), 19(2), Cov. LJ. 65, para70. 
56 See the European Commission's revised explanatory note of 18 March 2013 concerning the 
conduct of an inspection in execution of a Commission decision under Article 20(4) of Council 
Regulation 1/2003, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/explanatory_note.pdf, last visited on 02.03.15. 
‘Explanatory Note to an Authorisation to Conduct an Inspection in Execution of a Commission 
Decision under Article 20(4) of Council Regulation No 1/2003’ (Explanatory Note). 
57 Inspectors can also disconnect running computers form the undertakings networks; remove and re-
install hard drives from computers and search other forms of electronic devices such as DVDs, CDs 
and USBs. 
58 Wood, , ‘Submitting to an inspection’, p.66. 
59 Energeticky a prumyslovy and EP Investment Advisors v Commission (Case T-272/12) [2015] 4 
CMLR2 
60 A member of staff un-blocked an email account that had been blocked and diverted on the request 
of the inspector. 
61 Wood, ‘Submitting to an inspection’, p.68. 
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instructions by the inspectors at the premises as well as proactive cooperation. This 
supported what was already stated in Article 23(1)(c) that there is no need for any adverse 
consequences as a result of the lack of cooperation to be proven for there to be an 
infringement. The decision of the GC and the new guidelines on the obligations placed on 
undertakings in relation to electronic information would appear to be extremely unforgiving 
and imperious.  
 
Although some argue that the ‘European Commission’s efforts to include more specific 
information on this increasingly important part of its inspections are to be welcomed’.62 Wood 
makes a clear argument for the difficulties such powers pose to undertakings, as there 
appears to be a very low threshold for negligence placed on them by the GC. This not only 
gives inspectors unmitigated control over the actions of representatives of a business, it also 
‘makes no allowance for the frailties of the human condition’ 63 and creates difficulty for 
these representatives to prove months later that they were not uncooperative; when the 
communication is mainly oral. As Wood puts it, it is ‘easy for issues to be forgotten, for 
misunderstandings to occur, for internal communications to break down’64 in the dramatic 
and unsettling environment of a Dawn Raid on their offices. Considering the fines that the 
Commission can place on undertakings for lack of cooperation it is arguable that there 
should be much clearer guidance on where an undertaking will be held liable for such an 
infringement and there should be a greater obligation on the inspectors to document all 
requests made in order to safeguard the rights of an undertaking. Wood also argues that the 
Commission should balance the powers that have been granted to them by making 
provisions under Article 23(1)(c) to require evidence that the actions of an undertaking have 
‘actually or potentially prejudiced the overall investigation’.65 However, as information 
regarding a breach of competition law could potentially be ‘relocated or deleted with a touch 
of the keyboard or button’66 it is clearly tricky to establish where a breach may have resulted 
in the loss of information if there was no prior knowledge of it in the first place. Therefore, it 
would appear that there is not a simple method of ‘balancing’ the powers of the 
Commission’s official inspectors with the rights of defence of the undertakings in relation to 
the ever changing use of electronic devices and communication. As a result of the decision 
in Energeticky businesses will ‘ability of a business to advance credible explanations for its 
                                            
62 Kovacs, C., ‘Fiat lux…? - The European Commission's updated explanatory note on dawn raids’, 
(2014) 35(4), ECLR 162, para.165. 
63 Wood, ‘Submitting to an inspection’, p.69. 
64 Ibid, para.69. 
65 Ibid, para.71. 
66 Ibid, para.66. 
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conduct during an on-site investigation will be hampered’67 and so, until this decision is 
appealed or another is made against it, businesses will have no choice but to take extra 
precautions to ensure that they do not act uncooperatively with inspectors. 
 
2 Suggested Improvements 
Despite the arguments put forward for the importance of increasing the Commission’s 
powers of investigation, many still believe that it has ‘chosen to ignore the criticisms levelled 
against its powers’ and that it is ‘only a matter of time before changes will have to be 
made’ 68 to align such powers with the ECHR and allow adequate protection for 
undertakings. This is because the investigative procedures of the Commission, most notably 
‘Dawn Raids’ are well known for their ‘long-lasting negative effects on the company…both in 
relation to the often massive negative publicity…and in relation to the very time consuming 
internal investigations’69 that undertakings feel are necessary to follow up such intrusions. 
The Commission warns undertakings of the risk of breaching Competition law as 
investigations are not only ‘time-consuming and costly for companies’ but the ‘resulting 
media coverage, both general and specialised, could have a detrimental impact’ and ‘they 
may face hostility from clients and consumers who feel cheated’.70 Although this warning is 
in relation to an actual breach of competition law, the same detrimental publicity will still be 
present simply for the publication of a Dawn Raid at the premises of a business.   
 
Some changes have been suggested by critics of the current investigatory system that may 
enhance the protection of undertakings during and after inspections. Berghe and Dawes 
recommend an enhancement of the powers of the President of the GC. The GC currently 
has ‘exclusive competence’71 to review the assessments made by the Commission in 
relation to an inspection by examining the Statement of Reasons in a Decision. The 
President is empowered to suspend a Decision72 made by the Commission before an 
inspection takes place. It is arguable that an undertaking should be entitled to immediately 
request the President to order the suspension of an inspection when the Commission 
officials are ‘at its doors’. This would obviously be beneficial to an undertaking as they are 
then entitled to an immediate judicial remedy that would bring a halt to an inspection which 
may have otherwise impeded their business. There are two clear difficulties with such a 
                                            
67 Wood, ‘Submitting to an inspection’, pp.70-71. 
68 Berghe, P. and Dawes, A., ‘Powers of inspection’, p. 23. 
69 Anderson, ‘Dawn Raids’ p.135. 
70 ‘Compliance Matters: What companies can do better to respect EU competition rules’ publication, 
2012, p.12 available at http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/compliance-matters-
pbKD3211985/?CatalogCategoryID=8BYKABstR7sAAAEjupAY4e5L, accessed last 02.03.15. 
71 Berghe, P. and Dawes, A., ‘Powers of inspection’, pp.410. 
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change in procedure that are already outlined by Berghe and Dawes. Currently interim 
measures such as a suspension of an investigation can only be made by parties that have 
challenged the legality of the Commission’s Decision. Therefore, if this power were given to 
the GC President, an undertaking will need to have already challenged the legality of the 
Decision and applied for annulment to be entitled to lodge a request for a suspension of an 
inspection. If an undertaking has not yet challenged the Decision, then it is stipulated that 
they would need to lodge two different actions to the GC simultaneously, which would be 
unreasonable as an application for annulment would take such a length of time to compile 
and lodge that it would frustrate the overall intended purpose of filing both actions. 
Therefore, the bureaucratic system currently in place would prevent an undertaking from 
protecting their rights even with an improvement to the powers of the General Court in 
reviewing the Commission’s actions. Berghe and Dawes have proposed that an applicant 
should be allowed to file ‘one-page applications’ that can be completed swiftly in order to 
protect their rights in time for a decision by the President to be made during a Dawn Raid. 
They would then be entitled to supplement this single page document before lodging judicial 
proceedings. Although this would solve the issue of undertakings being able to file for interim 
measures to suspend an inspection as it happened, it does nothing to address the difficulties 
that would consequently be faced by the President.  
 
If undertakings were entitled to lodge such a request to the President, a decision would be 
expected within a matter of hours in order to take effect sufficiently. As Berghe and Dawes 
outline, this would mean proceedings would be ‘mainly oral and not written’.73 The matter of 
a strict and short time limit along with a lack of definite documentation to record such 
decisions would create obvious practical problems. Competition law would not be the only 
area to have such demanding time restrictions however, as their article raises the issues of 
deportation of illegal aliens and halting of construction work also requiring speedy decisions 
for interim measures. Yet Berghe and Dawes do not seem to have considered the impact 
that Dawn Raids on undertakings suspected to be involved in a cartel may have on such 
quick decisions. As there is an issue of undertakings communicating the occurrence of Dawn 
Raids to other members of a cartel, and therefore giving them advanced notice to destroy 
essential evidence to an investigation, it is often the case that inspections are carried out on 
multiple premises simultaneously. Therefore it is possible that several undertakings my 
lodge requests for the suspension of an inspection to the President of the GC at once. Such 
an overwhelming deluge of documentation may mean that it is virtually impossible for the 
President to return decisions to all of the undertakings in a reasonable time. Therefore it is 
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arguable that such a system would not be efficient and have little impact on protecting the 
rights of undertakings during inspections. Nevertheless it is possible that in such a scenario 
the facts of the objections may be very similar for each of the undertakings, as the fictional 
situation would involve members of the same cartel and therefore the same offences. As 
such, it may be less demanding for the President to issue responses to all of the 
undertakings at once, as a review of the facts would not take as long to complete.  
 
Overall, the Commission is entitled to effective powers to obtain information relevant to their 
investigations in order to enforce competition law and deter infringement. The use of Dawn 
Raids has a clear impact on the Commission’s ability to detect infringement of Articles 101 
and 102 whilst the powers to request or demand information and the controls used by 
Inspectors during Dawn Raids allow for the preservation of important documents. The 
expansion of the Commission’s powers to include electronic information appears to be a 
positive step in enforcing competition law. There is an ever-present need to ensure the 
protection of the rights of undertakings both in relation to the ECHR as well as general rights 
to a fair trial and judicial review regarding such actions. The delicate balance between the 
powers of the Commission and its inspectors and the rights of undertakings has most 
definitely not been reached yet. It would appear that such a balance would benefit from extra 
safeguards for undertakings through requirements on inspectors to record requests and 
answers during Dawn Raids, so as to allow for appeals after fines have been imposed. 
Although compliance is vital during inspections, the Commission must ensure that it 
promotes discretion on the part of its inspectors in relation to the circumstances of each 
Dawn Raid. Inspectors are active participants in far more Dawn Raids than the employees of 
an undertaking; therefore even with support of specialised legal advisors, consideration 
should be made for the vulnerable situation in which employees find themselves.   
 
3 Powers to Fine:  
Procedural Infringement 
Along with the extended powers of the Commission to inspect the premises of undertakings 
and request information, their powers to fine those that do not comply with such demands 
and actions under Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003 is another area that has fuelled debate 
among onlookers. Many have commented on the recent development of investigations and 
some have noted that ‘tough enforcement against cartels has resulted in some eye-watering 
fines’.74 This has led to appeals to the GC for reduced fines and much criticism of the 
powers that the Commission grants itself in its ability to fine for substantive and procedural 
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infringements of competition law. There have also been complaints that the fines are fair for 
infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, but not proportionate in relation to procedural 
offences such as hampering investigations.  
 
The first area of concern in relation to the Commission’s power to fine undertakings is their 
ability to fine based on procedural infringements. Under Article 23(1) of Regulation 1/2003, 
the Commission may impose fines up to and not exceeding 1% of the total turnover of the 
preceding business year. Examples of such fines include the first ever fine for such an 
infringement; E.ON75, which was fined €38million for obstruction when the Commission 
discovered seals affixed to the premises during a ‘Dawn Raid’ had been tampered with. 
Other examples include where an inspector is impeded from access to premises during a 
Dawn Raid, even when only for a short period of time76, and where email accounts were not 
blocked and diverted to specified locations on the inspector’s command77. All of which 
accumulates to a startling picture of the powers held by the Commission to punish 
undertakings even before they are found to have infringed Articles 101 or 102. Although it 
would appear heavy handed of the Commission to impose such fines, it is arguable that 
without such a deterrent on undertakings to hinder the investigations of the Commission, 
there would never be opportunity to find conclusive proof of infringements of competition law. 
If every undertaking were to refuse inspectors entry during ‘Dawn Raids’ and ignore their 
obligations during investigations, it is likely that the majority of incriminating material would 
conveniently disappear. 
 
The power to fine for infringement of procedural rules requires further investigation. At 
present there is little requirement for evidence that an infringement of this sort has had an 
impact on an investigation and a possible finding of an infringement. Therefore it would 
seem that this is an area where new guidelines could be put in place to require an inspector 
to give proof that information may have been lost through ‘evidence’ that seals etc. have 
been tampered with. The requirements cannot be too stringent as the improvements to 
information storage through electronic data collection, emails and databases may make it 
difficult for inspectors to prove that there were documents of value that have been lost when 
the process can be instantaneous.  
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Substantive Infringement 
Along with the possibly heavy handed approach taken by the Commission to impose fines 
for procedural breaches, the fines for substantive breaches of competition law are also 
contentious. The original Regulation 1778 gave no explanation for how fines were to be 
imposed other than the maximum threshold. There was no ‘indication in the regulation 
whether the purpose of the fine is deterrence, punishment, ensuring the offence does not 
pay, or some combination of these and perhaps other factors’.79 It is possible to argue that 
this early lack of boundaries and guidelines was effective, if not too powerful, in allowing the 
Commission as much freedom to impose fines as it saw fit.  
 
However, it could now be contended that the new Regulation80 increased the potency of the 
Commissions fine-giving capacity by aiming to ‘increase the deterrent effect’81 fines have on 
undertakings. As Spink argues, it is clearly ‘necessary to ensure that an undertaking does 
not profit from an infringement’82 and so an increased fine that considers the ‘level of…ill-
gotten gain’83 may be more likely to deter undertakings from participating in a cartel when 
they have conducted a ‘cost-benefit’ analysis of their situation. An example of an eye-
watering fine by the Commission can be found after the investigation into a possible abuse 
of a dominant position by Intel84 in 2009. After being found to have committed abuses of 
competition law in the form of hidden rebates to manufacturers and payments to 
manufacturers to delay the launch of competitor’s products, Intel were fined a total of €1.06 
Billion. Such a hefty fine would obviously have an impact on the decisions of undertakings 
when considering either participating in a cartel or abusing a dominant position. 
 
This aim for deterrence is focused on preventing undertakings from ‘ever entering into 
seriously illegal conduct’ by imposing an ‘entry fee’ in cartel cases of between 15-25% on top 
of the infringement fine, no matter the duration of the infringement. Additionally, the new 
Commission Guidelines85 on the method of setting fines allow it to increase this fine by up to 
100% where it is found that an undertaking has re-offended in the context of competition law. 
This means that where an undertaking enters into an anti-competitive agreement they will be 
given a fine of at least 15% of their profits on the product in question for the preceding year 
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but this fine could increase dramatically depending on the circumstances, for example in 
2008 Saint Gobain86 were fined a total of €896 million after its basic fine for infringement of 
Article 101 was increased by 60% because it was known to be a ‘repeat offender’ in 
competition law.  
 
Under the Guidelines, a ‘wide margin of discretion’ is given to the Commission when 
calculating the fines for undertakings. Although Notices and Guidelines are not legally 
binding, Dansk Rorinsdustri87 does highlight the legal effect of the fining Guidelines. It was 
stated that by adopting the Guidelines, the Commission has imposed limits on its 
discretion88. Further, that if the Commission were to depart from following its own Guidelines 
on setting fines then it may be in breach of the principles of equal treatment and legitimate 
expectations. This ties in with the importance of certainty for undertakings to know what they 
are letting themselves in for when taking part in a cartel or other infringement. These 
principles are not strict rules of law, however they have nevertheless been described as 
‘rules of practice from which the administration may not depart in an individual case without 
giving reasons that are compatible with the principle of equal treatment’.89 
 
Although the combination of such fines can add up to a substantial and possibly crippling 
amount for the undertaking, indicating that the Commission could have the power to ‘make-
or-break’ a business, the knowledge that the Penalty Guidelines impose a cap on the fine of 
no more than 10% of the offender’s previous year turnover worldwide would show that the 
Commission would not damage or alter the condition of the market by applying competition 
law.90 Despite the possibility of a hefty fine being placed on an undertaking, the fact that the 
Commission calculates such fine based on the ‘particular circumstances of the case’ and 
‘the context in which the infringement occurs’ as well as insuring that ‘its actions have the 
necessary deterrent effect’91 highlights that it is using its given discretion to assign a fine 
based on many factors, rather than a blanket system which means that the fines given are 
both fairer, and not binding on future cases. The Guidelines themselves specify that the 
Commission will take into account factors such as mitigating or aggravating circumstances 
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and the undertaking’s ability to pay92, all of which demonstrate the reasonable steps taken 
by the Commission to impose fines that meet the need to deter future infringement and 
protect competition in the common market. 
 
The more recent comments made in Dansk Rorindustri also support the Commission’s duty 
to consider the context and ‘gravity of infringements’ when calculating a fine. This ‘gravity’ 
can be based on ‘numerous factors, such as the particular circumstances of the case, its 
context and the dissuasive effect of fines’93 with particular circumstances outlined by AG 
Tizzano. These factors include the volume and value of the products in questions along with 
the size and economic strength of the undertaking and therefore the influence it can have on 
the market. Tizzano continued his list of considerations that should be made by the 
Commission in calculating a fine with the particular conduct of the undertaking in the 
infringement and the benefit they obtained from the anti-competitive activities94.  
 
The example of Saint Gobain highlights the importance of discretion with regards to the 
circumstances of each case. The infringement related to a cartel between four car glass 
producers who were found to be infringing competition law through price fixing and 
market/customer sharing between 1998 and 2003 with the total fine reaching just over €1.3 
Billion. Unsurprisingly Saint Gobain received the largest fine due to their status as a ‘repeat 
offender’ whilst Pilkington received €370 million as a basic fine. Asahi and Soliver however 
received reduced fines by the Commission. Asahi’s fine was reduced by 50%, to €113.5 
million as the information it provided was relevant and helpful in uncovering the total 
infringement. Soliver received the lowest fine out of the four with just €4.4million as it had not 
fully participated in all of the activities of the cartel. 
 
The time limitations placed on the Commission in relation to when they can fine an 
undertaking may also indicate that their powers are safeguarded effectively. Under Article 25 
of Regulation 1/2003 the Commission can wait no longer than 3 years after a procedural 
infringement to fine an undertaking, or 5 years for all other infringements and penalties. This 
would indicate, not only that the Commission is under particular pressure to ensure that it 
investigates infringements in a speedy and efficient manner, but also that their ability to fine 
is not as sweeping as it would appear at first glance. The fact that the time limit does not run 
from the first day of infringement but from the latest day, means that the infringement is 
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committed over a period of time. This is considered a continuous infringement of competition 
law and so a fine can be imposed later than initially expected.95 Therefore it would appear 
that even where the Commission is restricted in its ability to enforce competition law through 
the restriction of its powers, the court has managed to ensure that the Commission retains 
its powers despite the safeguards. 
 
When considering the implications of the Commission’s discretion in relation to procedural 
and substantive fines, it would appear that there is no outright evidence that its powers are 
too great. Instead, it would seem that there is no conclusive answer as to the effectiveness 
of the Commission’s powers to fine undertakings that strikes a fair balance between the 
rights of an undertaking and the aim to reduce anti-competitive behaviour. The fact that there 
is still confusion as to the effectiveness of fines indicates that there is a requirement of a 
systematic evaluation of the impact of fines and leniency on the activity of undertakings.  
 
Conclusion 
It is clear that the European Commission holds very broad powers in relation to the 
enforcement of competition law. Of course such powers are essential in achieving the aim of 
protecting the European free market from distortion or abuse of dominant position, however 
the extent to which these powers can influence the functioning of businesses is an issue that 
deserves further analysis, not just from critics of the current implementation of competition 
law but also by the Commission itself.  
 
When examining the powers held by the Commission to investigate a possible breach of 
competition law two main areas of concern are apparent. These relate to the Commission’s 
powers to request or demand information from undertakings and the right to perform Dawn 
Raids on undertaking’s premises. It would appear that the Commission’s ability to obtain 
information from undertakings through requests and demands is entirely reasonable. The 
Commission is at an immediate disadvantage in relation to the information it holds on 
undertakings that may have infringed competition law. Without the ability to demand 
information from these businesses under the threat of fine for the breach of competition 
procedural rules, there would be no way for it to effectively investigate the actions of 
undertakings in the European market.  
 
Dawn Raids are the main cause of alarm by critics due to their naturally intrusive nature.  
The ability of official inspectors sent by the Commission or NCAs to halt the machinery of a 
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business in the form of blocking emails, interviewing employees, confiscating hard-drives 
and cordoning off areas of their workplace is extensively disruptive to warrant further 
assessment by the Commission. Although the Commission’s ability to conduct Dawn Raids 
is vital to its capacity to investigate the actions of undertakings, discover infringements of 
competition law and prevent further infringement, the extent to which it should be able to 
disrupt a business during working hours demonstrates the fact that there should be efficient 
safeguards in place for the businesses in question and adequate transparency. Although 
there have been suggestions to improve the protection of undertakings through allowing 
them to file for a suspension of investigations with the President of the GC, it would appear 
that there is yet to be a sufficient answer to this problem. There are many difficulties with 
such a suggestion including the huge workload that would be placed on the President and 
the short time-limit to which they would be subject. The problem has become even more 
complicated than originally thought with the improvements made to electronic 
communication and data storage. Therefore the prospect of limiting the Commission’s ability 
to investigate premises at short notice to prevent the loss of data could be extremely 
unwelcome.  
 
As such, it may be more reasonable to propose that the methods through which the 
Commission investigates the breach of competition law by undertakings should not alter. 
Instead, there should be a less complicated and fairer approach to ex post judicial review 
that can be sought by undertakings and they should be entitled to adequate compensation 
for the interruption to their business where no breach has been found. Of course, if the 
Commission later finds that there was in fact a breach of competition law which took place 
before and during the investigations in question, such compensation would be claimed back 
along with the fine. 
 
The fines that the Commission is capable of imposing on undertakings for a substantive 
breach of competition law or a procedural breach during investigations have also come 
under scrutiny by critics. The hefty fines that have been enforced against undertakings that 
have breached competition law in recent years have fuelled the need to further investigate 
the powers granted to the Commission. From a closer examination, it would appear that the 
fines imposed against undertakings for substantially breaching competition law are more 
than justified by the Commission and may indeed be seen as too low with the use of the 
Leniency Programme.  
 
Although it is clear that the threat of possible Dawn Raids, has had a significant impact on 
the amount of information the Commission holds and the discovery of many cartels, the 
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significant reduction if not immunity from fines based on the Leniency programme can be 
seen as a weakness of enforcement. There is clearly a need to reconcile the effectiveness of 
leniency with the deterrence needed to prevent future infringement. The automatic ‘entry fee’ 
of 15-25% on top of the general infringement fine goes some way to achieving this. It still 
appears that there is not an effective balance between fair punishment for infringement 
despite leniency, and incentive to reveal participation in a cartel. 
 
Finally, although the presence of the Leniency Notice may indicate that the Commission is 
not utilising its fining powers efficiently to punish undertakings, almost the opposite can be 
said for the fines imposed for procedural infringements. At first glance these fines appear to 
be an overreaction by the Commission where the infringement seems accidental or minor. 
However, when considering that such minor infringements of procedural obligations may 
result in the complete destruction of any information that may link an undertaking to 
participation in anti-competitive activity, it seems that such fines are justified. As with the 
difficulties outlined in relation to restricting the Commission’s powers to Dawn Raid 
premises, the resulting fines after such Dawn Raids, where an undertaking is argued to have 
not ‘fully cooperated’, would appear to pose a similar problem. There is very little an official 
inspector can do to prove that undertakings employees have destroyed evidence after the 
fact, therefore it is the undertaking’s employees that are subject to obligations to ensure that 
such a suspicion never arises. If they ensure that they comply with all of the instructions set 
forward by the inspectors and prepare in advance for investigations, then there is no risk of 
being subject to a procedural fine. Despite the evidence that the Commission has not 
granted itself powers that are too great when enforcing competition law, it is still advisable 
that it conduct an internal investigation into taking a less aggressive approach in relation to 
Dawn Raids.  
 
